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Ever since Diamond and Carey’s (1986)
seminal work, object expertise has often
been viewed through the prism of face
perception (for a thorough discussion, see
Tanaka and Gauthier, 1997; Sheinberg and
Tarr, 2010). According to Wong and Wong
(2014, W&W), however, this emphasis has
simply been a response to the question of
modularity of face perception, and has not
been about expertise in and of itself. It
is precisely this conflation of questions of
expertise and modularity, the consequent
focus on FFA, and the detrimental effect
this had on the field of object expertise
research that we discussed as part of our
original review (Harel et al., 2013).
We fully acknowledge that some
recent works on visual expertise—
particularly outside the domain of real
world object recognition (the focus of our
article)—have started to discuss object
expertise beyond sensory cortex (e.g.,
Wong and Gauthier, 2010; Wong et al.,
2012). However, at the same time, other
high-profile works continue to focus on
expertise solely in the context of FFA
and face-selectivity (McGugin et al., 2012,
2014), arguing that their results are incon-
sistent with the notion that “learning
effects are distributed throughout cor-
tex with no relation to face selectivity”
(McGugin et al., 2012, p. 17067).
Focusing on discrete regions when the
question is modularity, but focusing on
distributed effects when the question is
expertise itself, comes across as hold-
ing the stick at both ends and leads to
the widespread misconception that FFA
plays a privileged role in expertise. Of
course, one can show that expertise effects
occur within FFA while simultaneously
acknowledging the widespread effects
of expertise across the cortex. However,
the significance of the former result to
the understanding of object expertise is
greatly reduced by the latter. Put simply,
the more distributed expertise effects are,
the less significant is the role of one partic-
ular region for our understanding of the
general mechanisms of object expertise.
Take for example, the widespread effects
of car expertise, which includes even early
visual cortex (Harel et al., 2013, Figure 2).
Thus, a continued focus on the relation-
ship between expertise and face processing
detracts from the study of the general
principles underlying real-world object
expertise.
Beyond the issue of modularity, W&W
suggest we mischaracterized prior research
by stating it often emphasized expertise as
an automatic, stimulus-driven skill, with
little impact of attention, task and high-
level cognitive factors. However, we found
this criticism rather surprising given (i)
the extensive discussion of automaticity
and interference in the expertise literature
with many studies suggesting that process-
ing becomes more automatic with exper-
tise (Tarr and Gauthier, 2000; Gauthier
and Tarr, 2002; McCandliss et al., 2003;
McGugin et al., 2011; Richler et al.,
2011), and (ii) recent work explicitly
testing the hypothesis that car exper-
tise effects are invariant to modulations
of attention or clutter (McGugin et al.,
2014). In their response W&W suggest
that experts “tend to automatically pro-
cess their objects of expertise in a certain
way” but those processes can be “overrid-
den by higher-level cognitive processing.”
It is unclear how an automatic process can
be sometimes engaged and occasionally
overridden. This comes across as another
instance of holding the stick at both
ends.
Despite the points of contention we
have highlighted here, we are encour-
aged that W&W fully agree with the dis-
tributed interactive view of visual expertise
we discussed (Harel et al., 2010, 2013).
We are certain that future research fully
focused on addressing the distributed and
highly interactive nature of visual expertise
will provide new insights into the cortical
mechanisms underlying real world object
expertise.
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